4 physical places or the use of new photographic technologies. 9 Such practices would become central to recording a "history of the present," an act intimately associated with what scholars have broadly interpreted as the "modern experience."
10
Detached from the past, life, opinions and perspectives in France became preoccupied with the "ephemeral, fugitive, [and] contingent"-elements which the poet Charles Baudelaire intimately associated with the advent of la modernité. 11 Homilies to the modern and professions of faith in the "modern spirit" resonated amongst an entire generation and found expression in a variety of cultural, social and political projects throughout the nineteenth century. By midcentury, French outlooks revealed an infatuation with a cult of the modern, a trend first inspired by the revolutionary political culture of the late-eighteenth century that had set out to break irrevocably with the past and create a radically new type of society with no historical precedent.
In his Dictionnaire de la langue française published in the 1870s, the positivist philosopher and lexicographer Émile Littré listed the word "modernité" as a neologism dating from the late 1860s first coined by the literary critic Théophile Gautier. 12 In actuality, Gautier had employed the term at various times over the previous decade in his reviews, applauding works that were "of [their] time" and, by consequence, pregnant with elements of "modernité." twentieth century, "deriving from a secret conformity with our tastes."
14 For Doumic, a writer who came of age in an intellectual milieu where modernity not only symbolized an idea but a complete way of life and thinking, the appeal of la modernité was a given.
Words are a particular type of cultural artifact. They not only provide insight into the sentiments of the age in which they were produced but also offer a window into the conceptualization and ordering of an entire mental landscape constructed and assembled through speech. 15 The fact that intellectuals and elites began to think and speak in new terms of time and temporality did not imply there existed some transcendental meaning or truth within their judgments or that modernity had simply arrived at a given time. 16 The increasing penchant to interpret the world in qualitatively different terms from the past and identify certain attributes, sensibilities and outlooks as inherently "modern" were products of a culture and cultural vocabulary that prized all that was modern to the exclusion of the ancien and obsolete. This style of language and representation possessed, moreover, a specific social context and import as well.
It constituted a discourse employed primarily by cultural and political elites of the period who came to interpret the modern in accordance with their own social expectations and worldview. It was telling when the anarchist poet Arthur Rimbaud sneered at the pretense and smugness of bourgeois society in one of his poems during the 1870s, remarking sarcastically that in France "one must be absolutely modern."
17
Rimbaud was one among many French intellectuals who, whether in laudatory or deprecatory terms, saw fit to equate the bourgeois with all that was modern. Such perceptions 14 René Doumic, "La manie de la modernité," Revue des Deux Mondes (Paris: Bureau da la Revue des Deux Mondes, 1898), 148:925. 15 See: Michel Foucault, The Order of Things: An Archeology of the Human Sciences (New York: Vintage, 1994), xv-xxiv. 16 As Jacques Le Goff has noted, temporal consciousness is not naturally given or implicit in and of itself. It is a construction dependent on a certain understanding of time that relies on an opposition between past and present. See: Histoire et Mémoire (Paris: Gallimard, 1988), 25. talking about the world that is, in its very nature, self-referential. 21 As John Camaroff has pointedly argued, "in itself, 'modernity' has no a priori telos or content." It is not an analytical category, but an "ideological formation" that is constructed and reproduced to revere certain practices and values while denigrating others.
22
Once modernity is stripped of its essentializing qualities, all that remains are the varying discourses, ideological forms and cultural representations which give substance to this construction. The presupposed modern monolith vanishes, "melting into air," as Marx would have it. In light of its ideological and discursive properties, modernity has perennially been tied to an idiom of newness prized by cultural and social elites in the western world. It has underwritten and sustained a particular type of discursive power capable of representing sociallyparticular behavioral norms and values in universal and humanitarian terms while furnishing a rationale for their forcible imposition on others. 23 In its French variant, this universality has been intimately linked with the advent of bourgeois social primacy, making modern society virtually synonymous with the contours of a bourgeois worldview and ethos.
Although "modern society" did connote a world defined by certain "bourgeois" interests and aspirations, the coupling of bourgeoisie and French modernity frequently obscured the more nuanced relationship that existed between social identity and time in the nineteenth-century
French imagination, and to conflate the two concepts would be erroneous. As late as the 1840s, Prosper Enfantin could claim that modern society remained vague and ill-defined, and this at time when "bourgeois" had become a common facet of public and social discourse in France. In Enfantin's estimation, modern society "demanded a new speech" if it was to become a salient and living idea. 24 The development and elaboration of this "new speech" that would construct, convey and discursively possess modern time and society was still in the making at mid-century and it would not be until bourgeois identity underwent a crisis that prevailing views of modernity and modern society would became staples of nineteenth-century French public and cultural discourse.
In France, the bourgeoisie never accommodated the strict social schema proposed by Marxist philosophy. Whereas Marx saw the bourgeoisie as an explicit social group brought into existence by industrialization and the accumulation of capital, such socio-economic interpretations did not necessarily gel with the realities of nineteenth-century French economic and social development. 25 Over the course of the century, French industry progressed at a relatively slower pace in comparison to Great Britain and the United States, and the preservation of more traditional forms of artisanal manufacturing matched with a primarily agricultural economy entailed that a bourgeois class controlling the means of production was largely absent in France.
26
This is not to suggest that the term "bourgeois" had no relevance for French society.
Indeed, the character and origins of the bourgeoisie was widely debated and speculated upon throughout the early nineteenth century.
27
Yet "bourgeois" rarely constituted the class of producers and entrepreneurs that Marx believed to make up the new ruling class in industrial society. Rather, it connoted a mark of social distinction which encompassed a broad array of 24 OEeuvres, 33:28.
25
"The bourgeoisie is not a social class," the historian Jules Michelet aptly noted in 1846, "but a position within society."
29
The social pedigree associated with the rubric "bourgeois" was, by and large, a product of the political environment of the mid-nineteenth century. The political and social antagonisms stemming from the French Revolution persisted to agitate France well after the revolutionary movement came to its ambiguous close, and in the midst of such extreme unrest, traditional and established elites nurtured strong misgivings regarding the impact and consequences of democratic equality and popular sovereignty. Providing a case for the exclusion of the masses from politics, liberal ideologues warned of the deleterious influences that universal democracy and social equality posed for the stability of French society. "It is false that all men are equal,"
François Guizot, one of the foremost liberal spokesmen, explained in 1863. "They are, on the contrary, unequal by nature as by situation, by spirit as by body."
30
Highlighting the "organic inequality" which existed in nature, 31 liberals argued that not all possessed the necessary intellect and "capacité" to participate in public life. Education, wealth and social distinction exhibited one's ability to make judicious political decisions and conceptualize the greater social good outside of personal interest, and these qualities formed the basis of an open aristocracy which politicians and liberal critics associated directly with a new class in France, the bourgeoisie.
32
In the discourse of classical French liberalism, "bourgeois" demarcated an exclusive Tout court, the advent of mass politics did symbolize the death of the bourgeoisie in France, as Flaubert anticipated. Confronted with a political culture prizing democracy and equality, elites could no longer represented themselves as an exclusive and particular "bourgeois" social group standing above the people. Over the course of the 1850s and 1860s, allusions to "capacity" or bourgeois primacy gradually became replaced by references to "modern society" and "modern civilization." Unlike the terminology previously employed by classical liberals, modernity constituted a novel way of describing and labeling that relied upon themes of time and development rather than social and class distinctions. This shift from the social to the temporal accompanied a broad cultural transformation in which bourgeois identity gradually became supplanted by a universal modernity as elites espoused a new language and style of representation conforming to the demands of a democratic society. In this context, to speak of bourgeois modernity is a misconception. Modernity was the cultural construction that eclipsed the bourgeoisie within public discourse and inscribed elite identity within a new discursive framework.
Imagining The Modern Community
In 1867 'progress,'" opined Baudelaire. "He will answer that it is steam, electricity, and gas-miracles unknown to the Romans-whose discovery bears full witness to our superiority over the The sense of rapid change and novelty seizing the French imagination found expression in a wide array of publications and genres, underscoring feelings of transcendence and restless energy. While the poet Victor Hugo extolled the panorama of modernity he found growing up around him, describing a world "whose arteries are railroads and whose nerves are electric wires," expressions of wonder could be and often were tempered with more melancholic reflections as well. 44 Gazing upon a landscape of castles and crumbling monasteries, the conservative royalist Pierre-Simon Ballanche mournfully concluded that "these black towers crowned with crenellated stones must fall, these silent, tapering cloisters must be transformed into prisons or vast workshops for manufacturing. Our castles represent the time of knights and the feudal world. It is necessary that they disappear." 45 Flaubert expressed the same sense of dislocation in his novels, albeit with more panache and artistic flair. In The Sentimental
Education, he chose the image of Jesus Christ riding a steam engine through a virgin forest to symbolize sentiments of rapid change and novelty, conveying the impression of an irrevocable break with standard traditions and perceptions. 46 In this melange of things dead and things yet to be, the present appeared to the poet Alfred de Musset as a creature "half-mummy and halffoetus." "One cannot know," he lamented, "whether, at each step, one is treading on a seed or piece of refuse."
47
Reflections on industry and science underscored the idea that the nineteenth century marked a period of unprecedented change and transformation. Such assumptions were commonly reinforced through observations on city life and urban environments where the vista of texts was to give it a definition and reality of its own which an educated and literate French population could identify with, relate to, and comprehend. It is the world of words, Slavoj Žižek maintains, which creates the world of things because reality cannot represent itself. Social reality is constantly and necessarily mediated through the language which gives it symbolic meaning, shaping and dictating interpretations of society, history, and the world at large.
52
The textual nature of the modern signified, however, that it remained by and large the property of a narrow segment of the population. Books and newspapers were expensive in the nineteenth century. The average subscription rate for a journal cost between sixty and eighty francs at a time when agricultural workers earned no more than two francs and skilled workers no more than four francs per day. 53 Most publications remained beyond the means of workers and day laborers, even if they had the necessary literacy skills and leisure time to read them. As a primarily elite medium, texts reflected intellectual currents, social concerns, and topics of interests pertinent to educated society and readers. It was, therefore, unsurprising that convictions regarding the utility of scientific knowledge, the inexorable march of progress and the benefits of industry pervaded numerous journals, revues and books of the period.
Philosophical musings, reports on industrial innovations and the economy, descriptions of urban life and sociability: these subjects were both topical and attractive to an elite readership increasingly encouraged to view their world as the nec plus ultra of man's endeavors and accomplishment.
"The true bond," Flaubert once wrote, "is that of language." during his trip to Egypt in the late 1840s, remarking on the decadence and mystique of "the old Orient, land of religion and flowing robes." 59 Drawing liberally upon anthropological theories and orientalist stereotypes popularized throughout the nineteenth century, depictions of "the other" routinely took the form of temporal distance, offering a mirror image of the modern self.
Building upon the theories of leading anthropologists, critics and intellectuals readily subscribed to the belief that human development followed certain universal laws, construing the technological, social and intellectual disparities evident among differing cultures in evolutionary and stadial terms. The world was best understood, they argued, as a temporal mosaic in which less civilized and primitive societies coexisted alongside highly-developed and modern ones. In a world configured through notions of temporal pluralism and uni-linear evolutionary models, to encounter the primitive was tantamount to coming face to face with one's distant ancestry and traversing the centuries and millennia bounding a common genealogy. 60 It was through this understanding of the primitive that the possibilities of the modern came into sharp relief and assumed form, that men recognized themselves as eminently modern and superior. The modern man may have believed himself to be centuries ahead of the "savage," but these conceptual distinctions belied a troubling interdependence: the modern man needed the savage to imagine his own existence and identity. Conceptually, these identities may have been mutually exclusive;
in reality, however, they operated as part of the same discursive formation. Elite self-fashioning not only demanded a conception of the modern to valorize and celebrate; it equally required an object against which the possibilities of the modern could be projected and exemplified. As identities became increasingly mapped and constructed according to concepts of time and temporality, labels such as "primitive" and "savage" became integral to the cultural vocabulary of nineteenth-century elites and served to reconfigure both racial and social differences in new and vital ways.
62
The old language of "bourgeois" industriousness and capacity employed by liberal ideologues to justify their brand of class rule in France proved adaptable to the new tone espoused by elites and accommodated the needs of racial subjugation and subalternzation essential to shaping power relations in France's emergent colonial periphery.
According to the Martinican medical expert Étienne Rufz in 1860, the "savage" found beyond the confines of Europe possessed "a horror of work" which perpetually left him deprived of the benefits of modern society. 63 civilization furnished a persuasive means of discursively representing this universality. 66 It was not surprising that the "civilizing" and "modernizing" objectives of French colonialism corresponded with certain "bourgeois" interests predicated upon economic development and improvement. 67 Yet this modernizing initiative was hardly restricted to the distant worlds of the colonies. The landscape symbolic of modern progress and industry vaunted by savants, intellectuals, and politicians never extended far beyond the domains of French cities and towns, and la France profonde-the majority of rural areas making up continental France-could, at times, seem closer to the desolate and wild terrain of Africa than Europe. Visiting the department of the Landes located in the south-west in 1856, an education inspector submitting a report to
Paris depicted a desolate landscape, noting, "the eye loses itself as in an ocean, never encountering any habitation and seeing only forests extending far without limits." 68 The supposed pre-modern milieu of the colonies was not all that distinct from the under-developed and "savage" landscapes characteristic of the French countryside, and state administrators throughout the latter half of the nineteenth century were never modest when it came to noting the vital need of modernizing rural French society. "It is essential that not a single corner of French soil be bereft of these grand currents of richness and prosperity," the interior minister, the Duc de profonde to urbanites, and the sense of foreignness at home that such encounters engendered was telling. Village and city, just like metropole and colony, represented, as the economist Adolphe
Blanqui claimed in 1851, "two completely opposite ways of life." 70 This opposition remained tied to conceptual and qualitative differences that mapped out modern and pre-modern spaces. If
French cities were hailed as bastions of modernity, the provinces were popularly seen as static and resistant to change. Writing in the mid-1860s, the liberal pamphleteer Eugène Ténot clearly saw "two juxtaposed people" living side by side on the national soil, "one burning with a new spirit, the other languishing in another century." 71 Urban observers regarded French rurals with the same detachment and distance applied to colonial subjects. 72 Observing the prandial habits, dancing and festivities of Breton peasants in Rennes, Taine compared them to Arabs celebrating after a feast, remarking curtly, "mores remain very primitive here." Heading southward to
Toulouse, the native inhabitants of the region became even more peculiar. "In seeing them move and approach," he noted, "one feels that they are in the presence of another race." must be the work of some individuals who are enlightened enough to understand necessity and strong enough to vanquish the passive resistance of an immense majority that ignores the path it must walk." language of French elitism, subaltern groups were faced with the choice of assimilation or social marginalization. In either event, the imposition of modernity implied that the new society to come would unconditionally belong, both socially and culturally, to a certain group of men bolstering urban forms of politics, knowledge and sociability under the pretext of modernity.
Savages of Civilization
Making a tour of the Parisian environs after visiting the Exposition Universelle, Raimond de Miravals came across a spectacle on the periphery of the city seemingly at odds with the technological innovations and scientific demonstration he had recently witnessed in the exhibition halls of the Palais de l'Industrie: impoverished workers, streets filled with peddlers picking through rag shops and destitute shanty towns stretching out toward the horizon. "I have seen hidden miseries . . .," he recorded soberly taking in the sight, "those savages of civilization camped out on the deserts of the arrondissements."
77 Images of rustic peasants stuck in their ways and colonial tribes steeped in primordial ignorance may have offered convenient representations against which the material advancement and reason prized by urban elites could be valorized and held up as models for the rest of the world to emulate. Yet the optimistic narrative of progress and inexorable social development that underpinned such conceptions often obscured a darker picture. Modernity was capable of generating its own distinct forms of savagery and barbarism, and these "savages of civilization" could be just as loathsome as the "primitive" populations beyond the confines of cities and, arguably, more menacing.
The growing urbanization of French elites during the nineteenth century occurred in tandem with the emergence of an urban poor subject to novel forms of factory discipline, 77 Miravals, Causeries parisennes, 145.
deflated wages, slum-like living conditions, hunger and dearth on a daily basis. 78 The turn toward an industrialized economy engendered new disparities in wealth and power and, in turn, new social classes and divisions which radicals and conservatives alike recognized as the quintessence of "modern society." 79 Class conflict, increasingly evident in the rise of militant worker movements and socialist agitation during the 1830s and 1840s, "defined modern history,"
as the liberal statesmen and historian François Guizot claimed. 80 While elites fashioned themselves vanguards of modernity, such universal pretension concealed the fact that modern society was not solely made in their image. The bourgeois social order was perennially under threat and resistance could and frequently did assume violent and confrontational forms that periodically transformed cities, the imagined epicenters of modern progress and civilization, into sites of carnage, violence and instability not unlike those encountered in the colonies. calls a house in the nineteenth century, in this city that claims to be a modern Athens, the queen of civilization!" 82 These conditions certainly provided cause for concern, and not simply on humanitarian grounds either. "The persistence of base habits can be explained in part by the permanence of insalubrious and sinister quarters," wrote Charles Monselet. "The ugly calls forth the wicked." 83 Under such circumstances, urban slums served as the breeding grounds for a "class of men whose lack of education and precarious lifestyle places them in a state of dangerous hostility to society," as the influential liberal daily Journal des Débats warned in 1832. 84 These and similar opinions permeated leading periodicals and social-scientific studies of the day, corroborating the image or an urban poor that was degenerate, pathological, and a threat to social order and stability.
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Yet these depictions went further. Writing in the midst of an ill-fated Lyonnais worker uprising staged in 1831, the journalist Saint-Marc Girardin spelled out the grave danger that worker radicalism posed to the country, apprising his reader, "The barbarians who threaten society are not in the Caucasus or the steppes of Tartary; they are in the suburbs of our manufacturing cities."
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Hannibal was not now at the gates, in Girardin's opinion, and civilization itself hung in the balance. A state-sponsored inquiry into pauperism conducted in 1840 spelled out the evident dangers posed by the "extreme misery" suffered by the urban poor on a daily basis, cautioning that the insalubrious environment and lack of education found amongst the working classes could provoke "a relapse into savagery. These perceptions were seemingly validated in the summer of 1848 when rampant unemployment, political instability and the failure of government-sponsored social reforms prompted a working-class insurrection in Paris that left a death toll of some 1,400 in its wake.
Horrified critics reviled the so-called "Red Days of June" as an attempt to "roll back civilization" and create a "barbaric society." 94 Writing on the violence and slaughter that engulfed the capital, Henri Lecouturier described the worker revolt as "a new invasion of barbarians," a war of the disinherited and debased against the civilized and privileged. 95 The participation of the Armée d'Afrique in subduing the June insurrection only further highlighted these colonial undertones.
Generals Juchault de la Moricière and Louis-Eugène Cavaignac-both of whom had acquired notoriety serving in Algeria-were summoned back from North Africa just as the Parisian revolt erupted and given full powers to crush the rebellion and restore order by any means necessary.
For the next six months, Cavaignac, de la Moricière and other members of the Algerian command were hailed as the "saviors" of the republic and rewarded with key positions in the government to ensure order. Algerian journalists could hardly fail to note the evident irony of the situation. As one writer for the Algerian daily Akhbar wryly commented, "France has not wanted to assimilate Algeria and now Algeria is on the verge of assimilating France!"
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In the coming years, efforts to control urban workers and curb civil unrest would increasingly come to figure in the "modernizing" projects implemented by the state. Under the Second Empire, old slums conducive to crime and disease were torn down and replaced by large avenues and boulevards, public parks, gardens and ornate buildings housing upscale residents.
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The narrow, medieval streets and working-class quarters which had consistently proven to be strongholds for urban insurrectionists in time of revolution were destroyed and replaced by wide Oriental has little by little been transformed into a modern city," the journalist Augustin
Marquand could declare by 1869 as he gazed out over the landscape of Algiers, "and the civilization of France has come to implant itself heroically in the heart of barbarism."
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More than mere colonial braggadocio, Marquand's assertion was a testament to the state's efforts to construct the topography of modernity and the boundaries it signified, actively bringing into existence the "modern" metropolis envisaged by elites. It was primarily due to Napoleon III's urbanization campaign that the cleric Antoine Arbousse-Bastide could extol Paris as the "capital of the modern world" during his trip in 1857. 101 Through the refashioning of urban spaces, "modern civilization" acquired a geographic and spatial dimension within French territories that not only symbolized the dramatic divergence of past and present, but also reinforced the temporal antinomies vital to modernity's imaginative social geography. As Eugène Ténot tendentiously observed in 1865: "All that which has, turn in turn, moved and animated the people of our cities remains absolutely foreign to [the people of the countryside]." 102 By consequence, urban culture became equated with modern culture, the 98 significance of which became strikingly apparent as the urban landscape and forms of leisure, entertainment and sociability it encouraged came to furnish the substance of the modernist aesthetic. 103 The dichotomies which structured a new elite sense of self were, however, only essential as long as they were useful to rationalizing certain power relationships conducive to democratic rule. A chronic suspicion of the working classes and the threat they posed to the social order persisted throughout the century, and this ultimately compelled French political elites to rely on the support of the rural peasantry in sustaining a conservative democracy. To this end, the conventional image of the rural "savage" proved incongruous with elite objectives, and it was unsurprising that in the wake of the Paris Commune leading republicans would seek to rehabilitate the image of the peasant and associate the rural world directly with the interests and progressive values of the nouvelles couches social. 104 The transformation-both real and imagined-of la France profonde under the Third Republic revealed the extent to which modernity was a construction shaped and re-shaped through the discourse of elites as the cultural representation of the archaic peasant was replaced with that of the modern citizen. 105 If scholars have traditionally accorded a significant role to mass participation in defining a process of "political modernization," the republican "synthesis" of the late nineteenth century urges further examination into the discursive formations and cultural representations imbedded within the very concept of modern politics itself.
The Archeology of Modernity
The existence of social groups is dependent upon the discourses and narratives that shape them. 106 Yet in a political culture predisposed to view social hierarchies and distinctions with suspicion, the traditional means of articulating group and social identities necessitated a new style of social representation. Modernity offered both a compelling language and story for conceptualizing a particular culture and lifestyle in temporal and historically-specific terms, permitting self-fashioned modern men to express their superiority and social primacy within the framework of a nominally egalitarian culture and polity. The idiom of newness popularized in nineteenth-century France helped construct a series of social and geographic boundaries which organized identities and power relations in a society being transformed by democratic politics and revived colonial aspirations. As elites began to speak through a language of time and temporal distance, they gave embodiment to the idea of an imagined modern community, furnishing notions of a shared time and culture which would provide a measure of cohesions amongst a diverse stratum of society that defied the socio-economic homogeneity central to Marxist interpretations of the bourgeoisie.
Resting upon a conceptual antinomy between the "modern" and "primitive," temporal identities offered an effective rationale for a new form of discursive power that eschewed direct references to categories of class and race and collapsed them within a discourse of time that assigned a leading role to self-identified vanguards of progress and human development.
Accusations of deficiency and social atavism made up a common language of exclusion and ascribed subaltern identities to those who remained hopelessly out of touch with the currents of industry, science and progress valued by urban elites. Inscribed within these juxtapositions and temporal identities was, therefore, a powerful legitimization for forms of social power and control that deviated from the established discourse of French liberalism and bourgeois primacy.
If the dictates of modernity have conventionally implied a marked "bourgeois" worldview and ideology, this denouement invites a more nuanced appraisal. In the outlooks of French social and cultural elites, modernity signified the absence of an explicitly bourgeois world, even if only to reinterpret bourgeois identity, interests and values in exceedingly universal and oblique terms.
At its most elemental level, "modern society" signified a rejection of the cultural pluralism and diversity that exist in the present, contrasting a monolithic modernity against a variety of superannuated and historicized forms. Construing identities and social relations through notions of anthropological time, the new language of elitism transformed alterior cultures and societies into little more than artifacts destined to be effaced by the progressive movement of history, a process broadly understood as the colonization of primitive spaces by modernity. Universal in its scope and conceptualization yet emblematic of a minority of the population, modernity constituted the exclusive preserve of a privileged group invested with a mission to modernize the primitive and conscript outsiders into the confines of modern life.
Up until relatively recent, scholarship on modernity remained in the shadow of this modern monolith, denoting a process patterned on European economic and social development during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. 107 Yet as Timothy Mitchell has observed, one of the chief characteristics of modernity has been its "autocentric picture of itself as the expression of a universal certainty" which has largely relegated non-Western countries to the margins of history. 108 It might be added, moreover, that this narrative was largely prefigured by nineteenthcentury actors who used similar criteria to construct and articulate their own modernity against 107 Anthony Giddens has assessed this process, defining modernity as the "modes of social life or organization which emerged in Europe from about the seventeenth century onwards and which subsequently became more or less worldwide in their influence. 
